COMPARISON OF THE MENTAL POWERS OF MAN AND THE LOWER ANIMALS-continued
The moral sense-Fundamental proposition-The qualities of social animals-Origin of sociability-Struggle between opposed instincts-Man a social animal-The more enduring social instincts conquer other less persistent instincts-The social virtues alone regarded by savages-The self-regarding virtues acquired at a later stage of development-The importance of the judgment of the members of the same community on conduct-Transmission of moral tendencies-Summary.
I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers (1. See, for instance, on this subject, Quatrefages, ‘Unité de l'Espèce Humaine,' 1861, p. 21, etc.) who maintain that of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important. This sense, as Mackintosh (2. ‘Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy,' 1837, p. 231, etc.) remarks, "has a rightful supremacy over every other principle of human action"; it is summed up in that short but imperious word "ought," so full of high significance. It is the most noble of all the attributes of man, leading him without a moment's hesitation to risk his life for that of a fellow-creature; or after due deliberation, impelled simply by the deep feeling of right or duty, to sacrifice it in some great cause. Immanuel Kant exclaims, "Duty!
Sign in to unlock this title
Sign in to continue reading, it's free! As an unregistered user you can only read a little bit.
